Because the DAO of nodes is collateralized with their own tokens they assume the interface price is correct, and that bid that are too low or too high might not be properly collateralized and therefore not allowed. Unfortunately durring testing there is very low volume and this interface price is less defined; in the near future the dex will function a little more traditionally with partial fill orders... however, bids and asks that are held in escrow will still need to meet collateral requirements.
What if I would like to set a flash crash price?
Can that 20% limit be altered?
Honestly, I don't think I have seen that anywhere else.
My best buys have been done by providing liquidity, albeit at a steep price.
The problem is this DEX is built on escrow transactions. It takes collateral to have the escrow agents to hold open an order. If liquidity is being provided at the steep price there is less operating collateral to facilitate trades at the operating interface.
This is a novel approach to exchange, and I'm sure the numbers for these margins didn't get it perfect on the first try. Everything is in active development and subject to change, within reason and security in mind.
But let say you can set a order of 50% the current market value. Currently it takes 2x collateral to hold a trade(to provide for these margins)... this means out right it's advantageous to forfeit the collateral and manually submit the transactions to steal the Hive you've put up for trade. Of course this take two parties... but sock puppets are a thing.
Several trading pairs have daily volume approaching total supply, the liquidity squeeze would be felt elsewhere.
The network would see that the operators of the DAO have taken your Hive and you would get the DLUX you wanted to purchase. The user's funds are always safe, however... the network itself won't survive such vulnerability.
The proposal I have in the DHF... number 152 is to build a multi-signature account that would collectively control the account where Hive/HBD is sent for these trades. This way it would take a plurality of network actors to get at the Hive/HBD balance... Much safer, and the collateral limits would be far less restrictive.
While "partial fill" is the main selling point this is the more nuanced game theory of such a DAO that is hard to explain at best.
Because the DAO of nodes is collateralized with their own tokens they assume the interface price is correct, and that bid that are too low or too high might not be properly collateralized and therefore not allowed. Unfortunately durring testing there is very low volume and this interface price is less defined; in the near future the dex will function a little more traditionally with partial fill orders... however, bids and asks that are held in escrow will still need to meet collateral requirements.
So, how do I get some dlux?
Place a buy order within 20% of the current price... see if anybody wants to sell. Or buy one of the sell orders listed.
👍
What if I would like to set a flash crash price?
Can that 20% limit be altered?
Honestly, I don't think I have seen that anywhere else.
My best buys have been done by providing liquidity, albeit at a steep price.
The problem is this DEX is built on escrow transactions. It takes collateral to have the escrow agents to hold open an order. If liquidity is being provided at the steep price there is less operating collateral to facilitate trades at the operating interface.
This is a novel approach to exchange, and I'm sure the numbers for these margins didn't get it perfect on the first try. Everything is in active development and subject to change, within reason and security in mind.
But let say you can set a order of 50% the current market value. Currently it takes 2x collateral to hold a trade(to provide for these margins)... this means out right it's advantageous to forfeit the collateral and manually submit the transactions to steal the Hive you've put up for trade. Of course this take two parties... but sock puppets are a thing.
Several trading pairs have daily volume approaching total supply, the liquidity squeeze would be felt elsewhere.
I must be missing something.
If I set up a fat finger catcher I can get my hive stolen?
If I set only a 20% margin am I only marginally protected from bad actors?
I'm just trying to buy some dlux at an advantageous price, but you tell me I could lose my hive to bad actors?
Is there a more in depth explanation of what is happening there?
The network would see that the operators of the DAO have taken your Hive and you would get the DLUX you wanted to purchase. The user's funds are always safe, however... the network itself won't survive such vulnerability.
The proposal I have in the DHF... number 152 is to build a multi-signature account that would collectively control the account where Hive/HBD is sent for these trades. This way it would take a plurality of network actors to get at the Hive/HBD balance... Much safer, and the collateral limits would be far less restrictive.
While "partial fill" is the main selling point this is the more nuanced game theory of such a DAO that is hard to explain at best.