emergency, liquidity, rejection, et cetera, conditionality and all that. But up popped long-term capital. Nobody thought a hedge fund, they were looking at a row of country dominoes. Nobody thought that there was a hedge fund domino in there where there was. And then that became the eye of the storm. By September 1998, we were looking at, and that was bailed out by Wall Street. Although I should put the word bail out in quotation marks, Wall Street didn't bail out long-term capital. They bailed out themselves. What they did is they came up with about $4 billion all cash. They bought the balance sheet, from then on they owned it, and then they didn't orderly unwind instead of a disorderly unwind. And they actually made, they got all their money back with a slave profit. The losses were on the prior investors, including the partners at LTCM, which is appropriate. They ran the fund. They should have suffered the losses. That was actually a fair result. But Wall Street wasn't doing anybody (14/98)
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