My assumption is that splitting one's SP into multiple accounts has long been undertaken, with the intention of doing exactly what is obviously possible in this vote: to deploy substantial stake to financially manipulate DPoS mechanisms by splitting it across accounts that do not reveal mutual association.
This has long enabled self voting by obfuscating ownership of SP such that votes from accounts all owned by a single user appear to be from multiple parties. The executive of the Steemalliance will be subject to this ploy.
There appears to be no oracular method to divine ownership of SP at this time, and thus no means of countering this vector for potential fraud. Some substantial stakeholders have thousands of accounts, perhaps tens of thousands. Let me know if you come up with a means of preventing such financial manipulation, but it appears there is no mechanism potential presently of securing DPoS as effected on Steem from this fraud.
I believe there is a way to reduce the ability for manipulation while still providing a means for investment.
It would mean to change things that power does not want to change. To say one single thing is to invite failure there is a combination of factors to be considered for each step.. I am sure you are aware of that though.
I didn't mention the word failure. However, I concede that is the obvious conclusion from the extant DPoS code that enables the 250k cap to be so easily circumvented, and voting fraud to be paid for with wrinkled bags of unmarked bills exchanged in parking lots.
I have proposed the Huey Long algorithm to end the extraction of rewards by substantially staked users into their wallets, to resounding silence. Gamblers don't want to prevent the possibility of a massive payout, despite it's guarantee of profiteering, and profiteers prefer to pile up more and more tokens worth less and less, despite the actual ROI from capital gains being vastly more financially rewarding.
The Huey Long algorithm is not effective at affecting this kind of vote, as electing board members is not directly profitable, and thus requires a different mechanism to protect it. What mechanism(s) do you have in mind?
We don't honestly believe that someone will go to this extend for the privilege of volunteering on a Board where the experience of volunteering and building the Foundation is the only reward. No remuneration, either through votes or through funds of any kind, is to be gotten through this engagement.
The Steem Foundation is a registered non-profit and anyone interested in it for personal profit should look elsewhere. It's brand new and not one of those Foundations we see on the news with million dollar galas. It's existence is solely meant for the universal benefit of the Steem ecosystem and blockchain.
I can certainly agree with you that no one would pay to volunteer - unless substantial opportunities to profit through other means are potential from the position. Given the influence these positions are going to have over lots of aspects of the blockchain, I hope, there does seem to be substantial potential to influence mechanisms that could be highly remunerative.
We want it to be 'solely meant for the universal benefit of the Steem ecosystem and blockchain', but there are demonstrably folks hereabouts that have no concern for anything but their money. I do hope that the foundation is able to exclude such, but I note that is a faint hope if examples of well funded foundations handling fiat are not more ripe for corruption than Steem's foundation.
I am confident that folks with pecuniary interest will be carefully examining these positions for any potential to profit from them. Assuming no one will seek to do so isn't reasonable. I may be cynical and paranoid, but not without reason. I hope I am less cynical and paranoid than you.
...for cynical and paranoid, read 'life experienced', and not naive