17
In addition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Cassell in his deposition spent
more than 50 pages detailing the investigations and assessment of all of the evidence used as a
factual basis for the Joinder Motion in the CVRA Case on behalf of Plaintiff. Menninger Decl.,
Ex. L at 61-117. During this soliloquy, Cassell details his and Edwards thought processes in
assessing the claims, their evaluation of the evidence they reviewed, and all other information
that he had to believe Plaintiff’s stories. He specifically refers to Plaintiff, their evaluation of the
evidence in light of the information they “knew” about Plaintiff, and their evaluation and thought
process of how the evidence supported her stories. Of course, the information they “knew”
about Plaintiff was a direct result of her attorney-client communications with them, and their
evaluation of that evidence in the case is clearly work product. In reciting the work product he
believes supports “Virginia’s” story, Cassell states that this is “important to Virginia” and “I
want to do a good job for Virginia Roberts on -- on representing all the -- the evidence that is
available to support her.” Menninger Decl.., Ex. L at 102:1-3 & 118:7-8. Having put these
matters directly at issue, and utilizing both their work-product and attorney-client
communications in support of the claims, there is a complete waiver of protection over 1) the
content of communications between Plaintiff and her attorneys, and 2) her attorneys’ work
product and thought process in investigating and “reasonable belief” in the claims.3
3
In a joint press release relating to the settlement of the Dershowitz Case, Plaintiff and her attorneys again
affirmatively cite to Plaintiff’s communications with them, their investigation of her statements, and their
assessment of her credibility. The references include the time frame prior to their initial filing as well as information
discovered throughout the course of the Dershowitz Cases. In that press release, Edwards and Cassel stated
“Edwards and Cassell maintain that they filed their client's allegations in good faith and performed the necessary
due diligence to do so, and have produced documents detailing those efforts.” Menninger Decl., Ex. M, p.1. The
press release continues in stating that it was a “mistake” to have filed sexual misconduct allegations against
Dershowitz citing, among other things, “the records and other documents produced by the parties.” Id. at 2. These
public statements provide a further waiver over the work product that led to the public acknowledgement that filing
the lawsuit and reliance on Plaintiff’s allegations was a “mistake.”
18
c. The elements for finding an at issue waiver are satisfied
As discussed above, “courts have generally applied the [at issue] doctrine liberally,
finding a broad waiver of attorney-client privilege where a party asserts a position “the truth of
which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication.” Bank Brussels
Lambert, 210 F.R.D. at 508. All of the factors for waiver have been met: “(1) assertion of the
privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2)
through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making
it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party
to information vital to his defense.” Id. 210 F.R.D. at 509-10. Here, Edwards and Cassell, with
the full knowledge and consent of Plaintiff, took the affirmative act of filing and participating in
the Dershowitz Case. Through this affirmative act, they put at issues what Plaintiff told her
attorneys, whether it was true, whether her attorneys helped her concoct additional allegations
that would help her position, whether they adequately investigated her claims, their basis for
believing Plaintiff was credible, and if they and their client were motivated to file false claims by
a desire for financial gain.
As discussed above, Plaintiff voluntarily and affirmatively waived the attorney-client
privilege through her testimony. That alone is sufficient to find an at issue waiver. Plaintiff also
permitted the waiver of the attorney-client privilege by permitting Edwards and Cassell to put
her communications with them and her attorneys’ work product at issue with her full knowledge
and consent. Plaintiff is a party to a joint defense agreement with Edwards and Cassell. She and
her attorneys were involved in communication about the Dershowitz Case beginning in January
- The case was preemptively filed to beat Dershowitz to the courthouse, before he could act
on his public statements that he intended to sue both Plaintiff and her attorneys for, among other
19
things, defamation. Plaintiff did nothing to stop her counsel from filing the Complaint, despite
the fact that it would necessarily put her communications with her counsel at issue. And, she
actively participated in the litigation. Indeed, the testimony of Cassell makes clear that the
purpose of the litigation was for Plaintiff’s benefit, and that he wanted to do a “good job” for her.
Normally, an attorney cannot waive the attorney-client privilege without his client’s
knowledge and consent. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101. But, “[a] client may nonetheless by
his actions impliedly waive the privilege or consent to disclosure.” Id., 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir.
- (citing See United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(implied waiver), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Drimmer v.
Appleton, 628 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (implied consent); Wigmore, supra, § 2327)).
In certain circumstances, an attorney may have “an implied authority to waive the privilege on
behalf of his client.” Drimmer, 628 F.Supp. at 1251; see also In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101.
“It is the client's responsibility to ensure continued confidentiality of his communications.” Id.
If a client is aware of her attorney’s waiver of privilege and takes no action to preserve
confidentiality, the privilege is lost. Id.; In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973) (“[i]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the
privilege under such circumstances, he must take some affirmative action to preserve
confidentiality”).
This situation is analogous to a client asserting advice of counsel as a defense, a situation
in which an at issue waiver of the full scope of attorney-client communications is automatic. See
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292 (defendant’s testimony that he thought his actions were legal would
have put his knowledge of the law and the basis for his understanding of what the law required
into issue, directly implicating his conversations with counsel); Chin v. Rogoff & Co., P.C., No.