The minimum threshold vote is set dynamically by stakeholders by the stakeweight they give to the refund proposal. I think this method is better than setting a hard limit, because it works by measuring "voting stake" versus existing stake. This eliminates problems like ignoring steemit's stake and even more problematic "dead stake" that can't vote due to loss of keys.
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Steemit's stake, as things are progressing currently, will be hidden and unaccountable, and can easily interfere and manipulate the allocations. Given likely voter participation rates, this can be done with even a small portion of it. IMO this is a poison pill that is a huge drag on the whole idea and makes it not a particularly useful solution to the issues brought forward by the "events" of the last week as you have described it.
I flat out do not trust the competence, judgment, and intentions of Steemit given experience with the past three years and I'm not anxious to support yet another system they can continue to screw up.
I realize this isn't terribly constructive but unfortunately I consider the "events" of the last week to be somewhat fatal to Steem ever truly recovering from Steemit's noxious influence, much as I might like to see it happening.
I'm also very unhappy about the powerdown to the exchanges of Steemit's stake, and I don't disagree with many of the things you've said about it's impact. I'm still vaguely hopeful they will realize it's a publicity disaster and stop it at some point.
Agreed, and somehow the community is prepared to swallow that poison pill again... until... it's fatal.