Tools and Techniques for Cognitive Security

in #cogsec5 months ago (edited)

CogSec (Cognitive Security) Collaborative

1. Tools and Techniques for Cognitive Security

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Tools and Techniques for Cognitive Security

by SJ Terp & Roger Johnstone
CanSecWest, March 18th 2020


2. Who are These people?

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SJ Terp, Pablo Breuer, Grant Dobbe, grugq, Roger Johnston, CogSec Collab Community


3. CogSec Collab: Roots

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Credibility Coalition - m!s!nfosec

  • Industry
  • Academia
  • Media
  • Community
  • Infosec

4. CogSec Collab: 2020 Mission

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  • bring together information security researchers, data scientists and other subject-matter experts.
  • to create and improve resources
  • for the defense of the cognitive domain

5. CogSec Collab: 2020 Milestones

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  • Milestone 1: April 2020
    • AM!TT Counters; Who, What, How
    • AM!TT Playbook PoC
  • Milestone 2: July 2020
    • AM!TT Playbook; Public, Social Media, ISPs, Government
    • Tooling; Threat Intelligence
  • Milestone 3: October 2020
    • AM!TT Playbook; refine
    • Tooling
    • Data Sets

6. COGSEC COLLAB: END USERS

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Who uses this stuff anyway?


7. RESPONSE ACTORS

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  • Platform
  • Government
  • Elves
  • Public
  • Influencer
  • Media
  • Nonprofit
  • Educator
  • Corporation

8. Elf Communities and Playbooks

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9. INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS

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10. DISINFORMATION LANDSCAPE

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The Only defense against the world is a thorough knowledge of it.

-- John Locke


11. DISINFORMATION

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deliberate promotion... of false, misleading or mis-attributed information

focus on creation, propagation, consumption of misinformation online

We are especially interested in misinformation designed to change beliefs in a large number of people


12. DISINFORMATION 'LAYERS'

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13. NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE

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Resources available in pursuit of national objectives...

Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic

...and how to influence other nation-states.


14. BUSINESS INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE

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Resources available in pursuit of corporate objectives...

Business Deals & Strategic Partnerships, PR and Advertising, Mergers and Acquisitions, R&D and Capital Investments


15. DESCRIBING DISINFORMATION

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AM!TT and other models of WTF is happening


16. AM!TT FRAMEWORK

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Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques = (AM!TT)

  • Credibility Coalition Misinfosec Working Group
  • AM!TT is a framework for understanding organized communication attacks

17. AM!TT FRAMEWORK

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18. AM!TT - T0010

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19. AM!TT - T0010

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IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT
Cultivate Ignorant Agents

  • "EBLA" NGO local staff
  • Attempt to co-opt US influencers

20. DISINFORMATION COUNTERMEASURES

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Moving from admiring the problem to action


21. MITIGATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES

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Countermeasures are that form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, is designed to impair the operational effectives of enemy activity. Countermeasures can be active or passive and can be deployed preemptively or reactively.

-- JP 3-13.1, Information Operations - Joint Chiefs of Staff


22. FINDING COUNTERMEASURES

  • Existing
  • Tactic-based
  • Technique-based
  • Doctrine-based

23. EXISTING COUNTERS

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24. TACTIC-BASED: COURSES OF ACTION MATRIX

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| AM!TT Phase           | Detect | Deny | Disrupt | Degrade | Deceive | Destroy | Deter |
| --------------------- | ------ | ---- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- |
| Strategic Planning    |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Objective Planning    |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Develop People        |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Develop Networks      |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Microtargeting        |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Develop Content       |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Channel Selection     |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Pump Priming          |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Exposure              |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Go Physical           |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Persistence           |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |
| Measure Effectiveness |        |      |         |         |         |         |       |

25. EFFECTS

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  • Detect: find them
  • Deny: stop them getting in
  • Disrupt: interrupt them
  • Degrade: slow them down
  • Deceive: divert them
  • Destroy: damage them
  • Deter: discourage them

26. ORGANISING COUNTERMEASURES

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27. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES

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"A disinformation campaign is made up of resources and infrastructure and operates over time, with them as a universal scarcity."

-- Grugq


28. CRITICAL ELEMENTS

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  • Resources
  • Infrastructure
  • Execution
  • Time

29. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES

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Critical ElementDetectDenyDisruptDegradeDeceiveDestroyDeter
Resources
Infrastructure
Execution
Time
  • resource exhaustion
  • cost-effectiveness
  • time constraints

30. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES


IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT

  • Resources
    • Staff ~16
    • Audience ~338k
    • Mobile D
      Slide44.png
      evices
  • Infrastructure
    • NGO
    • Operator Content Pool
    • Twitter Analytics
  • Execution
    • T0007, T0010, T0015, T0055, T0013
    • T0014, T0018, T0021, T0030, T0039
    • T0042, T0053
  • Time
    • Direct Engagement
    • No Automation + Bots
    • 'Audience Building' Phase

31. PLAYBOOKS

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32. RP_0003_fake_engagement

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33. THREAT INTELLIGENCE TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

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things we borrowed from infosec


34. OASIS STIX™ 2

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  • AM!TT needed a standard for data exchange
    • Relationships + Rich language
    • Extensible
    • Intelligence Sharing (ISACs & ISAOs)
    • Integration with community tooling
  • AM!TT is now available as a STIX 2.0 bundle

35. STIX AMITT

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Misinformation STIXDescriptionLevelInfosec STIX
Reportcommunication to other respondersCommunicationReport
CampaignLonger attacks (Russia's interference in the 2016 US elections is a "campaign")StrategyCampaign
IncidentShorter-duration attacks, often part of a campaignStrategyIntrusion Set
Course of ActionResponseStrategyCourse of Action
IdentityActor (individual, group, organisation etc): creator, responder, target, useful idiot etc.StrategyIdentity
Threat actorIncident creatorStrategyThreat Actor
Attack patternTechnique used in incident (see framework for examples)TTPAttack patter
NarrativeMalicious narrative (story, meme)TTPMalware
Toolbot software, APIs, marketing toolsTTPTool
Observed Dataartefacts like messages, user accounts, etcArtefactObserved Data
Indicatorposting rates, follow rates, etcArtefactIndicator
VulnerabilityCognitive biases, community structural weakness etcVulnerabilityVulnerability

https://github.com/cogsec-collaborative/amitt_cti


36. AM!TT + MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

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  • Navigation of STIX formatted data
  • Visualization
  • Red + Blue team planning
  • Exportable layers

https://www.cogsec-collab.org/project/amitt_navigator/


37. IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT

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38. MISP - Open Source Threat Intelligence Platform

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  • Store and share structured data
  • Enrichment + Automation
  • Open + Extensible
  • ISAO + ISAC + Elves

https://www.misp-project.org/


39. AM!TT + MISP

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  • MISP Misinformation Galaxy containing AM!TT Framework definitions

40. AM!TT + MISP

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41. AM!TT + MISP

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  • AM!TT Techniques Galaxy
  • DFRLab Dichotomies of Disinformation Taxonomy
  • MISP Objects
    • forged-document
    • blog, meme-image

42. AM!TT + MISP

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  • MISP Event Graph
    • blog
    • microblog
    • forged-document
    • person
    • user-account

43. OpenCTI - OPEN THREAT INTELLIGENCE PLATFORM

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  • STIX 2.0
  • Knowledge Graph
  • Report based
  • MISP integration

https://www.opencti.io


44. AM!TT + OpenCTI


45. NEXT: AM!TT + Atomic Threat Coverage

  • Done: AM!TT Techniques
  • Next: AM!TT Counters
  • Playbooks are assembled from sets of counters
  • Markdown, Confluence, API, ...

https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage


46. COMMUNITY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES


things we borrowed from data science


47. CogSec Collaborative - AM!TT m!s!nfosec

Join the Elves

CogSec Collaborative helps communities counter disinformation.

48. THANK YOU


CogSec Collab
https://www.cogsec-collab.org
@bodaceacat
@VV_X_7

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Fascinating and inspirational examination and consideration of how to free our minds and prevent Machiavellian manipulation of humanity, avoid the malevolent hazards inherent to Space Age technology, and enable absolute freedom prophesied millennia ago, or suffer the twisted hellscapes madmen willing to commit any atrocity intend.

Thanks!

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