Forgot to mention one thing: the SP delegation feature which will be introduced in 0.17 will fit your needs better.
Steemit Inc., the company, and some whales, will delegate their SP to "verified" good voters, so they'll have more influence and earn more curation rewards.
That's nice, especially if the group of "verified good voters" extends beyond the usual suspects, preventing the "same guild, but now obfuscated"-criticisms, but that's a different thread.
Yes it's considered. But it's weak against Sybil attacks. Bad actors can distribute stakes to many smaller accounts and gain more influence and earn more financial returns.
Thousands of minions and dolphins would also fully support sublinear vote strength, btw.
IMHO they'll be disappointed for sure. Although at this moment they have advantages, it's wrong if they think they'll have advantages forever. At last bots running by whales will win.
True, but (paraphrasing you) "smaller accounts gain more influence and earn more financial returns", and there will always be abuse anyway; possible abuse maybe should be fought in other ways when it keeps you from selecting the best solution. But never mind, I get your point.
I do wonder why this has been presented in previous discussions as a choice between given mathematical functions. Why not draw the curve by hand that does what you want it to do, then find the best fitting function? Not all that important either, I just sometimes wonder about such things.
The conclusion of previous discussions, as proposed in 0.17, was to give smaller accounts more influence than they have now, but still smaller than big accounts. What I proposed now, is to give same stake the same influence.
By the way I'm not good at drawing curves, but my proposal is a simple straight line.
Forgot to mention one thing: the SP delegation feature which will be introduced in 0.17 will fit your needs better.
Steemit Inc., the company, and some whales, will delegate their SP to "verified" good voters, so they'll have more influence and earn more curation rewards.
That's nice, especially if the group of "verified good voters" extends beyond the usual suspects, preventing the "same guild, but now obfuscated"-criticisms, but that's a different thread.
Yes it's considered. But it's weak against Sybil attacks. Bad actors can distribute stakes to many smaller accounts and gain more influence and earn more financial returns.
me and my 8 thousand little sock puppet accounts fully support sublinear vote strength.
lol
Thank you for coming forward, saves us some detective work 8-).
Thousands of minions and dolphins would also fully support sublinear vote strength, btw.
IMHO they'll be disappointed for sure. Although at this moment they have advantages, it's wrong if they think they'll have advantages forever. At last bots running by whales will win.
True, but (paraphrasing you) "smaller accounts gain more influence and earn more financial returns", and there will always be abuse anyway; possible abuse maybe should be fought in other ways when it keeps you from selecting the best solution. But never mind, I get your point.
I do wonder why this has been presented in previous discussions as a choice between given mathematical functions. Why not draw the curve by hand that does what you want it to do, then find the best fitting function? Not all that important either, I just sometimes wonder about such things.
The conclusion of previous discussions, as proposed in 0.17, was to give smaller accounts more influence than they have now, but still smaller than big accounts. What I proposed now, is to give same stake the same influence.
By the way I'm not good at drawing curves, but my proposal is a simple straight line.
Pff. That's just because you are no good at drawing curves 8-).
I like your proposal, btw, I also think linear is a good way to go.