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RE: How Vote Incentivization Degrades Delegated Proof of Stake

in #dpos2 years ago (edited)

Vote incentivisation for BPs used to be (or is still) rampant in Lisk. More generally, vote trading / exchange is a bad idea because it's value-agnostic ie. corrupt practice. BPs aside, the line blurs when it comes to voting to distribute resources in a social network. Relevant to vote maximisation, what do you think about this: https://steemit.com/steem/@kevinwong/distributing-wealth-should-be-equally-profitable ? Sorry there are no sophisticated proofs and such lol, just more like a rule of thumb / first principal thing.

Appreciate the attempt at some formal proof @anyx. Will spend some time on the questions :)

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Vote incentivisation for BPs used to be (or is still) rampant in Lisk

Definitely, and especially true for a lot of Lisk clones. That's one of the places which made me really think about what was happening.

I had a read through your post -- great stuff, something I had thought a bit about before as well. Curation reward used to be 50%, and I can't help but wonder if that was a better choice. I also miss a superlinear curve..

Something I'll have to dig into and think about more!