In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
...
President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
...
The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 5.
ICA Analysis Cites the Second Report Prominently, But Omits Critical Context That Would Cast Doubt on the Veracity and Anti-Trump Bias of the Source. The ICA obscures the implausibility of the report, by vaguely referring to "a plan" without describing its details. The details were important, because they were so peculiar as to likely cause readers to question the report's legitimacy. The ICA also obscured the source of the report, which had an anti-Trump bias, when ICD 203 specifically notes that analytic products should "describe factors affecting source quality and credibility" such as "motivation" and "possible bias."(redacted)
(redacted) What the ICA calls a Russian "plan" for engagement with Trump was actually an anonymous email proposal to place (redacted) - on Trump's "election team" in order to formulate a mutually acceptable agenda between Trump and Putin.(redacted)
(redacted) There is no explanation of how this would be done or why candidate Trump would want a well-known pro-Kremlin official on his campaign team and to endure the media furor that would likely result.
(redacted) The ICA bullet obscured the source as "an (redacted) Service" when it actually came from the (redacted) Service. Had the bullet clarified that it was from the (redacted), some readers might have known of (redacted) anti-Trump bias at that time, which would further undermine the judgment.
(redacted) There was no security justification for obscuring the identity of the (redacted) service, as the ICA was written for the President, who is cleared for everything.
(redacted) The ICA made no mention of Kiev's documented objections to candidate Trump. The Ukrainian Ambassador in Washington, Valeriy Chaly, took the unusual step (for a serving Ambassador) during the campaign of publishing an open letter in a US publication entitled, "Trump's Comments Send Wrong Message to World." The letter expressed Kiev's fears that candidate Trump was misinformed and, if elected, might hurt Ukraine by improving US relations with Russia.(redacted)
DCIA Ordered the Publication of a Third Substandard Report - Also From An Unknown Subsource - That Was Cited To Imply Putin's Preference for Trump. To support the topic sentence, "Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for [Trump]" the ICA quotes information from an "established source" but without clarifying that the ultimate source of the information is unknown (see box "The Established Source").
What the ICA Says: The "Established Source"
(redacted) "The established source with secondhand access ... noted that several members of Putin's inner circle strongly preferred Republican over Democratic candidates because they judged that Republicans had historically been less focused on democracy and human rights ...” [ICA p. 2-3]
The ICA describes the information in terms that most readers would view as more evidence that President Putin would have a "clear preference" for candidate Trump. But this is only accomplished by omitting key context details.
As with the other two substandard reports, CIA professionals originally declined to publish this information when it was acquired and only did so in response to DCIA's post-election "full review" order.(redacted)
(redacted) The information was acquired from the source via a secondhand source in (redacted) 2016, but was not published until 19 December 2016.(redacted)
The ultimate source of the information is unknown.
(redacted) While the established source received it from an identified subsource, the ultimate source of the information is not known, which the ICA failed to clarify.
(redacted) It is unclear if the original source actually had access to Putin's private statements or those of his inner circle, or if this was the subsource's personal opinions of Putin's personal thoughts, if this was a garble or misunderstanding, or if this reflected some other unknown person's opinions (see box Third Report Context Warning).
What the Raw Intelligence Says: The Third Report Context Warning
While the source obtained the information from an identified subsource, the ultimate source of this information was unknown. Additionally, the degree to which the ultimate source was aware of the private comments and views of Russian President Viadimir Putin and Putin's inner circle was unclear." (redacted)
The ICA also misquotes the report to indicate that Putin and his inner circle "strongly preferred Republicans."
(redacted) The phrase "strongly preferred Republicans" does not appear in the raw intelligence report.
(redacted) The unknown subsource said that "historically" the "Kremlin had found it easier to reach agreements with US Presidents from the Republican Party" and that this was because Republicans were "less concerned with issues that were unpleasant for Russia such as democracy and human rights."(redacted)
(redacted) The ICA did not take the basic analytic step, however, of comparing the plausibility of the unknown subsource claims to the documented policies of the past three Republican Presidents, all of whom featured democracy and human rights as cornerstones of their foreign policies. It brings to mind President Reagan's famous quote, "Mr, Gorbachev, tear down this wall" or President George W. Bush's comments on "the axis of evil."
The information does not appear to make sense in the historical context, further raising the question of the reliability of the unknown subsource.
By both obscuring that the reporting is from an unknown source with unknown access and that the information does not make sense, the ICA leaves the reader unaware of the weakness of the evidence cited to support the major judgment on Putin's intentions.
The ICA Failed to Address the Existence of Reliable Intelligence That Contradicts the Third Report's Unknown Source. Even part of the ICA's own classified text - based on reliable reporting - contradicts the information contained in the third substandard report. This raised further questions about why, contrary to ICD 203 criteria, the third report was cited as evidence of Putin's intentions without further explanation.
(redacted) Some senior Russian officials worried a Trump administration would bring hardline (redacted) security advisers or that a Republican controlled Congress would not support measures that would be beneficial to Russia, (redacted).(redacted)
- (redacted) cautioned about the risks to Russia of a Republican Administration, noting that "those who would hold positions in [a Trump] Administration should he win will likely adhere to conservative anti-Russian positions."(redacted)
(redacted) Additionaily, both the historical record and source materials for the ICA's "Annex D: Historical Patterns of Russian Influence in US Elections" indicate that the ICA "strongly preferred Republicans" judgment glossed over details in the Annex - from reliable sources - that contradict the claims from the unknown source on Russia's historical preference for Republicans.(redacted)
(redacted) "There are no [Russian] plans to target any Democratic presidential candidate for active measures because any Democratic candidate is preferable to President Reagan", (redacted)
Despite unknown sourcing, reliable contrary evidence, and implausible claims, the then Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, responding to a request to double check the sourcing behind the judgment, responded in a letter to the Committee that he nonetheless endorsed the ICA judgment (see box "DNI").
DNI Clapper Comments on ICA Citation of the Third Report
"I have reviewed the underlying source material myself and entirely concur in the judgment of the analysts, which I believe is consistent with standards of analytical tradecraft and objectivity.” [Letter to HPSCI, 12 January 2017)
The ICA Falsely Claimed the Third Substandard Report Was Corroborated By Body of Other Reporting. The ICA text is misleadingly drafted to suggest that some of the qualities of candidate Trump aligned with Putin's preferences for international partners, citing the third substandard report as evidence for the ICA judgment that "Putin developed a clear preference" for candidate Trump.
The ICA further claimed information from the third report was corroborated by liaison, diplomatic, and press reporting, as well as sensitive signals intelligence (SIGINT).
But in following-up every citation, none were found to corroborate the ICA claims.
(redacted) The ICA also used the third substandard report to claim that members of Putin's "inner circle" had compared Trump to other leaders with "business interests" that Putin could work with, using this a part of the supporting evidence for the judgment that Putin "aspired" to help Trump win.
(redacted) The cited liaison reporting didn't mention Trump at all, and was from 2014, _before Trump was a candidate.(redacted)
(redacted) The cited SIGINT also didn't mention Trump, and was nothing more than an (redacted)
(redacted) The cited diplomatic report is a post-election overview of Moscow from the US Ambassador that references a media opinion item by a Russian pundit suggesting that Trump and Putin should "work together like businessmen" which is hardly a corroboration of Putin's "inner circle" preferring Republicans or businessmen.(redacted)
(redacted) Ironically, the same Embassy cable quotes Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov as saying of Trump's election, "We do not feel any euphoria" citing a "bipartisan anti-Russian consensus", which directly contradicts the ICA judgment that the Russians preferred Trump.