In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
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President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
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The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 7.
The ICA Omitted Reliable Evidence That Putin's Key Advisers Saw Significant Downsides to a Trump Presidency. The ICA selectively excluded information from reliable intelligence sources that senior Russian officials had serious reservation about how a potential Trump administration could be bad for Moscow and complicate repairing relations with Washington.
The significance of that omission becomes apparent when reading the ICA's judgment of what Russian officials thought, which pushed the "clear preference for Trump" judgment that was directly contradicted by the raw reports cited by the ICA as sources (see box "Russian Views").
What the ICA Says: Russian Views of Trump
To support the judgment, "Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for [Trump] over Secretary Clinton" the ICA stated:
"in late (redacted) prepared an analysis for Russia's senior-most America experts in which he said the [Trump's] positive attributes - such as his perceived unwillingness to criticize Putin, his background as a businessman, and the presence of advisers viewed as positively inclined toward Russian interests - outweighed potential negatives such as perceived unpredictability, (redacted)." [ICA p.1-2]
(redacted) At a June 2016 Moscow conference on US politics, President Putin and two prominent Russian experts on US politics - Head of the USA-Canada Institute Sergey Rogov and Ambassador to Washington Sergey Kislyak - gave speeches on the implications for Russia of the US election. The format was an examination of the pros and cons of a Trump victory, (redacted).(redacted)
(redacted) The ICA focused on the "pros" of Russian attitudes towards Trump, while ignoring the "cons" the Russians worried about in the event of a Trump victory. The Russian officials and America experts were thinking hard about all implications, including that a Trump win might keep the House and Senate in Republican hands, and how that would be bad for Russia.
By omitting the below evidence, the ICA denied the reader access to significant intelligence that undermines the major judgment that Putin preferred Trump:
(redacted) warned senior officials that, "...it is important to be mindful that those who would hold positions in [a Trump] Administration should he win will likely adhere to conservative anti-Russian positions."116
(redacted) worried that, "the implications of a [Trump] victory and an ability to maintain control over both the House and Senate are serious. Legislatively, a conservative victory would probably be a dead-end for developing Russian-US relations."(redacted)
(redacted) made clear that he "took exception" to a "favorable view" of candidate Trump. He cautioned that there was "no basis for enthusiasm" simply because Trump refrained from using anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric.(redacted)
(redacted) Putin's (redacted) specifically noted that it is "unlikely Trump will be able to take steps to correct relations" while (redacted) agreed that Trump was unlikely to win and would be unable to improve US-Russia relations if he did.(redacted)
(redacted) Putin's (redacted) attributed his pessimism to factors beyond the control of Trump or Clinton, such as "Washington's inertia" and "a consensus among Washington politicians on the need to continue pressuring Russia," a view echoed by (redacted).(redacted)
(redacted) Far from showing a consensus "clear preference for Trump", the evidence indicates Putin and Russian officials saw downsides to a potential Trump administration. The intelligence also showed, that regardless of who won, Moscow expected a prolonged struggle to repair strained relations with Washington.
Voluminous and Likely Relevant Evidence Was Excluded From Consideration. Investigators as well as the ICA authors were denied access to a trove of information on grounds of executive or congressional privilege. The ICA glosses over the likely significance of the unexamined additional material to ICA judgments (see box "Unexamined").
What the ICA Says: Unexamined Russian Material
(redacted) "(redacted) is in possession of additional SVR cyber-enabled collection, exfiltrated from US Government and think tank entities and dated at least (redacted), which may further inform the judgments in this assessment. To date, (redacted) and the IC have not reviewed this data." [Footnote "b" ICA, p.5]
(redacted) This intelligence consisted of cyber data exfiltrated by the Russians, beginning in 2014, from computer systems at (redacted), and political groups and think tanks.
(U) The ICA footnote affords the reader no insight, however, into why this evidence was not reviewed or the potential significance of the additional material to ICA judgments.
(redacted) A senior FBI analyst told investigators that there were "many victims" from these Russian hacks.(redacted)
(redacted) The same analyst said that he argued that this intelligence should have been shared with the Directors' Fusion Cell analysts because it might have clarified the scope of Moscow's operational capabilities and potential leverage from additional influence leaks.(redacted)
(redacted) The analyst explained that the Obama Administration denied ICA drafters access to this intelligence on grounds of Executive or Congressional privilege.(redacted)