In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
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President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
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The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 9.
The ICA Glossed Over the Significance of Putin Holding Back His Most Damaging Material. The ICA mentioned that Moscow refrained from using "additional information." But it did so without addressing the strategic implications of what was held back, versus what was leaked, and how this speaks to Putin's objectives (see box "Moscow Could Have Done More.").
What the ICA Says: Moscow Could Have Done More
(redacted) "Moscow had additional information it obtained from cyber collection against US government and nongovernment targets - such as reports on Secretary Clinton's health - that it could have used against a Clinton Admiration's policies and nominees, based on (redacted)." [ICA p.3]
(redacted) "We assess that Moscow refrained from tha full spectrum of actions it could have taken to affect the US election. We judge that the Kremlin could have disclosed additional material ...." [ICA p.11]
(redacted) The ICA's generic description of the material Putin held back makes the reader unaware of significant information available to Moscow to denigrate Secretary Clinton. This violated ICD 203 directives that analysis "be informed by all relevant information available" given that documents leaked during the election were far less damaging to Secretary Clinton than those Putin chose not to leak.(redacted)
(redacted) As of september 2016, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) had Democratic National Committee (DNC) information that President Obama and party leaders found the state of Secretary Clinton's health to be "extraordinarily alarming" and felt it could have "serious negative impact" on her election prospects. Her health information was being kept in "strictest secrecy" and even close advisors were not being fully informed.(redacted)
(redacted) The SVR possessed DNC communications that Clinton was suffering from "intensified psycho-emotional problems, including uncontrolled fits of anger, aggression, and cheerfulness.” Clinton was placed on a daily regimen of "heavy tranquilizers" and while afraid of losing, she remained "obsessed with a thirst for power."(redacted)
(redacted) The SVR also had information that Clinton suffered from "Type 2 diabetes, ischemic heart disease, deep vein thrombosis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease."(redacted)
(redacted) The SVR possessed a campaign email discussing a plan approved by Secretary Clinton to link Putin and Russian hackers to candidate Trump in order to "distract the [American] public" from the Clinton email server scandal.(redacted)
(redacted) The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in August had details of secret meetings with multiple named US religious organizations, in which US State Department representatives offered - in exchange for supporting Secretary Clinton - "significant increases in financing" from Department funds and "the patronage" of State in dealing with "post-Soviet" countries. (redacted)
(redacted) FBI Director James Comey testified to the Committee that, in August 2016, the SVR had DNC emails in which the head of the DNC "was telling people that [former Attorney General] Lynch was working to control me and keeping a named member of the Clinton campaign informed on what the FBI was doing in the [Clinton] email investigation."(redacted)
(redacted) The SVR also had information that the DNC leadership and Clinton's foreign policy advisors had heard that US allies "in London, Berlin, Paris, and Rome" were not optimistic about a Clinton Presidency. They had "expressed notes of doubt regarding her ability to perform the functions of head-of-state" and her election would "create unfavorable conditions for advancing the foreign policy interest of the US."(redacted)
(redacted) The SVR reported in January 2016 that it had information taken from a US think tank indicating that a high ranking official in the Democratic National Committee (DNC) knew about the application of political pressure on the FBI in the Clinton email investigation by a high ranking official of the US Department of Justice.(redacted)
(redacted) In March 2016, the SVR had intercepted discussions between a high-ranking DNC official and a US non-governmental organization indicating that a Clinton staffer was receiving updates on the FBI's Clinton email investigation from a high ranking Department of Justice official.(redacted)
It is difficult to justify the ICA judgment that Putin "aspired" to help Trump win by discrediting Secretary Clinton, given that in the closing weeks of the campaign - when such devastating leaks could have been decisive - President Putin elected not to inject this material into the campaign.
At a minimum, the ICA should have identified this contrary evidence and addressed it. By not including this significant intelligence, the CIA violated ICD 203 directives that analysis "should be informed by all relevant information available" and that assessments "must not be distorted by, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience or agenda."(redacted)
(redacted) While the ICA did not address the significant strategic implications of what was held back, it does speculate on possible SVR tactical motives to explain Putin's decision to stop leaking after October (see box Speculation on Tactical Priorities).
What the ICA Says: Speculation on Tactical Priorities
(redacted) "SVR officers were protective of the accesses they used to derive intelligence reports for Putin ... and may have argued to prevent the disclosure of non-public material ... that, if disclosed, would have endangered continued collection on US dacisionmaking" (emphasis added). [ICA p.11]
The ICA speculation about SVR tactical priorities doesn't make sense, given that the media had already reported on Russian intrusions into DNC servers by June.
(redacted) their accesses were already blown by the GRU leaks and subsequent media reports and forensic investigations by private US companies, (redacted).157 158
The cyber security company CrowdStrike had done an analysis of the attacks on DNC servers, and company officials testified that security measures had been improved.(redacted)
(redacted) The ICA pointed out that politically sensitive decisions to leak or not were made by President Putin personally. So it still would have been his call - regardless of ICA speculation on what the SVR might have argued - to hold back material during the critical final three weeks of the election. Putin's strategic priorities would have trumped any SVR tactical concerns about accesses.(redacted)
(redacted) The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) published a report in early September quoting "European government experts" that noted candidate Clinton was building her lead in battleground states, and that candidate Trump would have "only minimal chances" of winning unless he was "... able to take advantage of yet more revelations concerning CLINTON's work as Secretary of State and, in particular, the growing scandal surrounding her use of her government position to attract large donors to the Clinton Family Foundation." The text suggests that Russian intelligence services were aware of candidate Clinton's potential vulnerability to ethical issues, which would highlighted the potential value of leaking the details of the secret meetings offering State Department patronage to religious groups in exchange for support to the Clinton campaign. The ClA redacted source details of this report, however, so it is difficult to assess the value of this intelligence without clarification of source access, reliability, or motivation. It is also not clear, because of redactions, if this information went to President Putin or his Presidential Administration staff. The ICA did not quote this report.