In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
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President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
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The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 2.
- The ICA defined these as "high confidence" judgments based on a "body of reporting from multiple sources" (see box "Putin's Intentions")(redacted)
What the ICA Says: Putin's Intentions
"We further assess Putin and the Russian government developed a clear preference for [candidate Trump]. We have high confidence in these judgments" (emphasis added). [ICA p. iii, ICA-U p. ii]
"CIA and FBI also assess with high confidence that Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help [candidate Trump's] chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton" (emphasis added). [ICA p. 1, ICA-U p. ii]
"We assess that Russian leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton." "When it appeared Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency." [ICA page 3, ICA-U p. 2]
The ICA judgments on Putin's intentions failed to adhere to the following analytic standards within ICD 203:
"Properly describe quality and credibility of underlying sources."(redacted)
"Properly express and explain uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments."(redacted)
Base confidence assessments on "the quantity and quality of source material."(redacted)
"Be informed by all relevant information available."(redacted)
"Consider alternative perspectives and contrary information."(redacted)
"Be independent of political considerations."(redacted)
Despite the ICA's significant tradecraft failures, the assessment demonstrated awareness of the ICD standards in a section describing analytic process:
"These standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to information), clearly expressing uncertainty, distinguishing between underlying information and analysts' judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives ..."
A critical part of the analyst's task is to explain uncertainties associated with major judgments based on the quantity and quality of the source material" (emphasis added)(redacted)
Unlike routine IC analysis, the ICA was a high-profile product ordered by the President, directed by senior IC agency heads, and created by just five CIA analysts, using one principal drafter. Production of the ICA was subject to unusual directives from the President and senior political appointees, and particularly DCIA. The draft was not properly coordinated within CIA or the IC, ensuring it would be published without significant challenges to its conclusions.
The tradecraft failures identified in this review are limited to sections of the ICA addressing Putin's intentions only. Because the ICA did not follow standard procedures for drafting or coordination within CIA and the IC, they should not be seen as an indication of systemic problems with analysis from CIA, NSA or FBI.(redacted)
Finding #3: The ICA Failed to Acknowledge That Key Judgments on Putin's Intentions Were Based on Raw Intelligence That Did Not Meet Tradecraft Standards
ICD 203 instructs that intelligence tradecraft "properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources" to include factors affecting the reliability of their information, such as "source access, motivation, possible bias or deception, and accuracy and completeness" (emphasis added). Accurate citation of raw intelligence reporting is critical to explaining to the reader the reliability of the evidence used to drive judgments, yet the ICA disregarded these fundamentals in sections that claimed Putin intended for Trump to win.(redacted)
Key classified reports, cited by the ICA in support of judgments that Putin developed "a clear preference" for candidate Trump and "aspired to help his chances of victory" contained flaws in terms of clarity or reliability. The ICA omitted or obscured such information from context statements - that the CIA's Directorate of Operations had properly added to raw human source intelligence (HUMINT) reports - thus failing to warn the reader of significant flaws in the quality or credibility of foundational sources.(redacted)
DCIA ordered the Publication of Three Reports - Wich Failed to Meet CIA Criteria for Reliability or Clarity - That Subsequently Became Key ICA Citations on Putin's Intentions. In response to direction from the President to make all information available, CIA officers said the DCIA ordered the publication in early December 2016 of 15 new or revised CIA HUMINT reports containing information on Russian activities collected prior to the election, that CIA professionals had decided not to publish for various reasons having to do with tradecraft standards.
Most of the 15 were unremarkable, but three contained flawed information and these three became foundational sources the ICA cited to claim Putin's aspired to help Trump win.(redacted)
Senior CIA officers said some of the information in these reports had been judged to have not met various longstanding IC standards for publication, and that is why they had not been published when first acquired. Two sensitive report were not published on DCIA's orders (see footnote at bottom of page).b(redacted)
The three reports were published after the election on DCIA orders, despite veteran CIA officer judgments that they contained substandard information that was unclear, of uncertain origin, potentially biased, implausible, or in the words of senior operations officers, "odd."(redacted)
The three reports became a foundational sources for the ICA judgments on Putin preferring Trump.(redacted)
b(redacted) CIA officers also said that DCIA personally directed that two of the most important reports not be formally disseminated when he first learned of them, ostensibly because they were too sensitive to create printed copies. We were unable to obtain a convincing explanation, however, for why DCIA did this, since the CIA has a special reporting channel (the (redacted) series) whereby sensitive reports are restricted to only the President or as small a "by name" group as desired. Experienced CIA officers noted that publishing a written report creates a formal record copy, vetted by expert collection management officers (CMOs) and linguists. Unclear or poorly sourced information would normally be removed or else explained in the context statement. Reading a published report ensures a consistent message to all recipients. By briefing the information orally, however, DCIA could have tailored his message to different officials, unconstrained by a consistent record copy.