"...(which would have solved the problem from its root)..."
My research indicates this is untrue, despite the fact that the present witness election system is faulty. There is ~210M Steem presently, and @justinsunsteemit now owns ~100M of it. Of the total, a significant percentage isn't voting for witnesss, whether from lost keys, bailed users, or whatever. @justinsunsteemit presently holds ~150% of the stake historically available to vote for witnesses.
No election system I can conceive of will make that weight of stake in a DPoS mechanism incapable of instant control of governance of Steem at will.
Thanks!
Wouldn't highering the number of consensus witnesses and applying the example you mentioned before allow the community to get few spots? 100/30 (or lower value with each vote) + limit number of votes / will give us a value than can be easily surpassed by some current whales to push many users to the top. What do you think?
The goal is to make it harder not impossible. We will always be in a situation where one or two people are controlling the top 20 spots, which is already the case now. If we nullify the stake of X the one behind it will again become the new player. But I guess this is a natural thing on a DPOS Blockchain.
Tron didn't mention if they brought the whole package (I mean all the Steem in all the accounts) but I can't see them sending 100 to null just for the sake of it.
See, this is why I like smarter people than me. I never thought of raising the number of consensus witnesses. Since that can be increased without limit, then at some point the stake of the minnows can at least elect a witness. Maybe through some combination of increased number of witnesses, per account limits on numbers of witnesses voted for, and making 1 Steem = 1 witness vote, control of the consensus could be prevented to any single stakeholder.
I think it's unlikely, but I'm not a competent mathematician.
Thanks!
That's idea: limit account voting up to 3-5 witness rather than 30 witnesses.
i am aware of certain users that have more than ten thousand accounts. Each of those accounts will be able to cast witness votes, which will allow that user to get around the limit on witness votes an account can cast. Many, many users have ten or more accounts.
Each Steem needs to only vote once for witness, and not 30 times.
Thought experiment:
Someone has 1000 SP. They vote for max number of witnesses. The witnesses each receive a 1000 SP vote.
Someone has 1000 SP. They split it amongst two accounts. 500 SP for one, 500 SP for the other. Each account votes for max number of witnesses. The witnesses each receive 1000 SP of votes.
Sybil attack is not possible with witness voting due to the "proof of stake" part of DPoS.
Here's an example of how extant 30x multiplication of stake weight inflates the value of substantial stakeholders in governance. User A has 1M Steem. User B has 100 Steem. User A votes 30x for witnesses, and casts 1M votes for each. User B does also, casting 100 votes for each.
In total user A casts 30M votes. User B casts 3000. The difference between the fiat value of their respective stakes is 999,900. The difference between the weight of their votes effecting governance of the blockchain is 29,997,000. This dramatically multiplies the impact the founder's stake has on governance, and contributes to Tron's ability to control consensus witnesses. If Tron is able to vote with 75M Steem for witnesses, it is able to cast 2.25B votes.
Each Steem should be counted once in governance/witness elections, to provide equitable weight to all stakeholders in governance of the blockchain. The extant voting method has now proven to be an immense security risk to the blockchain, whether you call it a Sybil attack or not.
To be clear, I agree with the idea of 1 SP 1 vote.
And I'm saying it can't be attacked vial Sybil attack.
So I'm saying it's a good idea that is maybe more secure than some think.
Good.
Thanks!